Abstract-Clouds are complex systems subject to an increasing number of anomalies and threats. In this paper we briefly revisit the issues related to Windows guest cloud service resilience and later provide some preliminary results on the resilience of Windows cloud guests via virtualization. In particular, we propose an architecture, Cloud Resilience for Windows (CReW). CReW can transparently monitor guest Windows VMs and can also react to both security breaches and system integrity violation, improving the dependability of cloudified Windows systems. CReW can also improve resilience from software misconfiguration by restoring the guest latest safe state. Effectiveness and performance of a CReW prototype have been evaluated; obtained results show the feasibility of such a system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Resilience [6] is the ability of a system to recover and provide an acceptable level of service in situations in which a component (HW/SW) is either missing (e.g. a crashed service or a burned component) or it is not behaving correctly, where this latter case can be originated by configuration changes, upgrades or attacks, to name a few.
In particular, the Windows kernel and services are constantly exposed to a number of new threats; new vulnerabilities are discovered that malware and especially rootkits can exploit to gain administrator privileges and hide their presence from spyware blockers, antiviruses, and system utilities. In fact, rootkits can intercept calls to the Windows libraries and modify the returned values in order to remain hidden [14] . Kernelspace rootkits can also intercept calls to execution ring 0 where they can alter kernel data structures. In addition, software upgrades and deployment of new components can reduce guest service functionality or open the way to new vulnerabilities and threats.
Windows-based services are often deployed on Linuxbased Clouds as Virtual Machines (VMs) [1] , leveraging the reliability of the underlying OS and the isolation benefits virtualized platforms can provide. Linux offers a securer hosting platform, offering at least two different hypervisor technologies, Xen and KVM [13] . The latter has been preferred to Xen in this work due to its tight integration with the vanilla Linux kernel and due to the better support from the majority of Linux vendors and developers who are slowly phasing-out Xen. This paper discusses the Windows guest cloud service resilience problems (see Figure 1 ) and provides some contributions. First, it describes an architecture, Cloud Resilience for Windows (CReW) for increased security of cloud resources and services. CReW can effectively improve the trustworthiness in such computing systems. CReW can transparently monitor guest Windows VMs and can also react to security breaches and to unauthorized system configuration changes, improving the persistence of the dependability of cloudified Windows systems. A CReW prototype has been implemented on a widely deployed cloud host software (Eucalyptus [10] ). Effectiveness and performance of a CReW prototype have been evaluated; obtained results show the feasibility and effectiveness of such a system.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: Section II summarizes state of the art solutions applied to cloud resilience; Section III describes CReW architecture and gives some implementation details; Section IV presents preliminary performance figures; finally, in Section V conclusions are drawn.
II. RELATED WORK
Cloud resilience and particularly security issues have been the subject of much recent research efforts, since undetected attacks can be extremely dangerous over time.
In Self-Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT) [4] all servers are considered potentially compromised. SCIT periodically restores servers from secure snapshots in order to make nodes resilient against long-lasting attacks. Similarly, VM-FIT [3] creates redundant server copies which can periodically be refreshed to increase the resilience of the server. Such systems do not support long-lasting sessions required by most complex server applications. Sousa's approach [19] leverages proactive recovery: In the case when the probability that services have been compromised exceeds a given threshold, clean service replicas react and substitute compromised ones. Similarly to the above-mentioned solutions, the Sitar [20] system relies on redundancy to obtain intrusion-tolerance. Sitar requires an IDS to successfully detect an attack for the intrusion tolerance mechanisms to operate. It remains to be seen what happens to sitar when the intrusion attempt is successful and goes undetected by the IDS. Also LoGrid [16] is an interesting example of resilience tool that adopts autonomic reaction mechanisms to protect from attacks.
Co-location attacks have been proven to be able to extract information from a target VM on the same hardware [15] . Placing a VM on the same host as the target VM can be easily obtained by an attacker, provided information on the cloud auto-scaling allocation algorithm is known.
Most recent approaches leverage CPU hardware virtualization support [11] to monitor Virtual Machines. SecVisor [17] and KVM-L4 [12] leverage virtualization to monitor guest kernel code integrity from a privileged VM or hypervisor. Such proposals have limitations that prevent them from being used in distributed computing scenarios (e.g.. SecVisor only supports one guest per each host) or do not scale up to large distributed systems such as clouds. KVM-L4 shares the same underlying technology as [7] but the additional context switching overhead in the 64-bit scenario (as in most cloud hosts) is not clear.
Among other solutions, SVGrid [21] creates a secure Xen-based virtual environment aimed at monitoring file and network access requests from a virtual machine where security policies are enforced. SVGrid provides isolation among applications by running multiple Grid Virtual Machines each running one grid application at a time. Also Smith [18] proposes a separation of grid components currently running on one machine into separate virtual operating systems. This prevents users from installing malicious software and driving inter-users attacks, since each user is confined to his or her own virtual environment.
Virtualization also introduces technological challenges that deserve special attention. They include an increase in the complexity of digital forensics and questions regarding additional vulnerabilities of the host system.
III. CREW ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed Cloud Resilience for Windows (CReW) is intended to actively monitor guest Windows VM and cloud middleware activity and integrity. Our proposal extends the KvmSec [7] and ACPS [8] approaches in order to protect guest Windows components from misconfiguration-enabled damage and against intruders and attacks such as worms and viruses. CReW is entirely contained in the host side and leverages semantic introspection [5] . This allows deploying and running unmodified guest VM images.
As shown in Figure 2 , in CReW, the host-side database Checks DB contains computed checksums for selected host infrastructure and guest kernel code, data, and files. In fact, the storage is virtualized and accesses are intercepted by the Interceptor/Actuator component. Further, off-line integrity cross-checks are periodically run over guest system configuration files, in order to detect differences between guest-returned file content and actual files on disk (crossview detection [14] ). The runtime HashC daemon repeatedly recomputes hash values of monitored objects and submits warnings to the AlertDB. The Evaluator daemon asynchronously examines such warnings and decides whether anomalies in the system behavior are present or the system is under attack. In such a case the Interceptor/Actuator is instructed to act according to a specified security policy. In fact, CReW can directly react to security breaches or delegate reaction to an external networked configuration/security management layer. CReW can also replace a misbehaving server on-the-fly by reverting back to the latest VM safe state. Alternatively the guest can be restarted from a clean backup image. CReW is integrated in the virtualization software and leverages Qemu [13] to access guest VM memory and status. Access to cloud middleware components is not mediated (see Figure 2 ) and allows to collect information over load level and functionality of such components. It is worth noting that no system call is ever blocked or delayed by CReW to check for permission violation and the kind of reaction our monitoring system can perform (freezing/restarting/reinitializing) cannot be distinguished from normal system maintenance tasks.
CReW actively intercepts and monitors guest Windows VM activity by leveraging virtualization-supporting extensions of recent CPUs [11] . CReW has been implemented entirely on open source software and has been deployed over Eucalyptus. In fact, it can be tailored and applied to other distributed systems and guests. CReW enjoys the following features: it is transparent to guest machines; it leverages CPU hardware virtualization, which renders the system less detectable on guest side, and it can be deployed on Linux-hosted cloud computing platforms.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section we present the results of our experiments aimed at evaluating CReW effectiveness and performance in real-world environments, facing configuration changes, events popping-up, and threats. Tests have been conducted using Athlon 64 X2 4400+ CPUs equipped with 4GB RAM; Ubuntu 10 04-based Eucalyptus ran on the hosts, KVM version 83. Each guest was given 1 virtual CPU and 1GB RAM. All guests ran 32-bit OSes while hosts ran 64-bit OSes. The guest operating systems were Windows Server 2003 SP1.
A. CReW Effectiveness
In this section we show how CReW copes with anomalies and attacks cloud services can be subject to. In particular, we report on practical experiments performed to measure the resilience of the proposed architecture. The detection and reaction capabilities of our system are assessed against the set of anomalies and attack techniques summarized in Table I . CReW has been proven to detect and to react to anomalies and attacks belonging to the above mentioned categories. In particular, we took from the current literature some relevant attacks (see Table II ) that actual Windows networked architectures can be subject to and we showed the added protection provided by CReW to guest VMs when the system is exposed to such events.
In particular, we simulated an anomaly of type AN1 by causing a partial update of an IIS Server hosted on a Windows VM. CReW notices the lack of response to request network packets targeted at the HTTP service. Once the anomaly is detected, CReW restarts the compromised server from a verified executable and re-establishes its configuration files.
Then, we implemented an attack of type AN2 by inserting a Rustock rootkit [2] in a guest VM. Rustock alters the syscall handler in order to change the execution flow to execute malicious code. CReW detects both the alteration of the handler and the change in the library files checksum on virtual storage. The reaction includes reverting back to the latest safe state of the virtual machine.
Finally, we implemented attacks of type AN3 by using the techniques cited by Ristenpart in [15] . First of all, both external (outside the cloud) and internal (from sibling VMs) network probing via port scanning is intercepted by CReW rules that raise an alarm that is inserted into the Alert DB. Secondly, in order to reduce co-location time, CReW stimulates and induces transparent migration of guest Virtual Machines from one host to another over time. As regards keystroke timing [15] , given that the attacker resorts to coresidence load measurements to analyze the time between keystrokes and collect sensitive information, CReW renders such attack less feasible since CReW itself is running on the CPU under attack, thus rendering times measurement results much less reliable for the attacker.
B. Performance
In order to test different kinds of workload we adopted commonly available tools on both Windows and Linux. In particular, we tested the performance of the following workloads: (1) CPU-bound; and, (2) I/O bound. We measured the time it takes a Windows cloud guest on Eucalyptus to perform two different kinds of operations:
T1 CPU stress tests: the Lame audio software is used to Figure  3 where bars represent execution times (lower is better). The same set of tests has been run on an unprotected Windows guest machine on the same Eucalyptus host. Values are averaged over the tested CPUs and show that the overhead introduced by CReW is proportional to the degree of protection/control frequency, and can be made quite small in relaxed mode.
The results of the I/O-bound tests are reported in Figure  4 where, as above, bars represent execution times (lower is better). The same set of tests has been run on an unprotected Windows guest on the same Eucalyptus host.
Values are averaged over the tested CPUs and show that the overhead introduced by CReW is quite large here, even though the overhead is still proportional to the degree of protection/control frequency, and can be reduced in relaxed mode.
These first results are interesting, and encourage us to perform further investigation aimed at reducing such overhead. Nevertheless, the impact on performance can be tuned as needed in order to obtain the required performanceprotection trade-off. It is worth noting that even though overall performance is degraded by the monitoring system itself, such performance penalty cannot be distinguished by the attacker from regular CPU load, since no system call is ever blocked or delayed by CReW.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we provide some preliminary results on the resilience of Windows cloud guests via virtualization. In particular, we introduce a novel architecture (CReW) for transparent monitoring of Windows guests and services. CReW can effectively improve the trustworthiness in such computing systems. CReW can also react to security breaches and to system misconfiguration, improving the dependability of cloudified Windows systems. The proposed architecture has been implemented entirely on open source software. Effectiveness and performance of a first CReW prototype have been evaluated; results show the feasibility and effectiveness of such a system. The bottom line is that virtualization can increase the resilience of cloudified Windows systems and services by leveraging smart monitoring of core components. As for further research directions, we aim to further investigate the support the CReW system can provide in securing Windows platforms.
